My comments regarding the Thai Constitutional Court's decision to declare February 2nd election null and void.
1. The most frightening aspect of today’s decision is not the nullification of the election, but rather the nullification of the Constitution and self-destruction of the court’s legitimacy.
1.1 In terms of procedure, Section 245 of the Constitution makes it clear that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the case. The court could only accept the case from the Ombudsmen when a legal provision is challenged to be contrary to the Constitution, but the case at hand deals with the operation and organization of the election that faced problems due to actions of protesters and not the text of any law. The court nonetheless conveniently ruled that the provision of the election decree setting February 2nd as the general election date was unconstitutional. This is inexplicable since the election decree only set one general election date and there is no constitutional ground to nullify it, except to provide excuse for the court to allow itself to have jurisdiction.
1.2 In terms of merit, Section 93 of the Constitution specifically prescribes a period of 180 days to rectify, and not nullify, troubled elections by organizing multiple elections that would be necessary to fill the seats in the House of Representatives. The language of Section 93 paragraph 6 is general enough to ensure that all problematic situations are covered, including situations where candidates in certain districts cannot register their candidacy. The court simply ignored the solution provided by the Constitution.
By acting so flagrantly in contrary to the Constitution, the court is elevating its status from mere opponent of politicians to the enemy of democracy. Once the people loses faith in the highest court of the land, they are more likely to take matters into their own hands, even if that comes with violence and anarchy.
2. The reasoning of the court is paving ways for anyone to have the power to nullify an entire election simply by obstructing candidates from registering in a single district. Ironically, it was the same court who refused to rule against the protest movement that led to such obstruction in troubled districts in the first place.
3. It no longer makes sense to attempt to explain the current political situation in Thailand by relying on legal principles and constitutional framework. The current situation is more or less a phenomenon of raw politics whereby the rule of law is conveniently stretched and stripped to fit a political goal. An election can only move forward if a pre-determined political outcome is likely to be satisfied.
It is now left for all sides to try to negotiate a political compromise that would allow the Democrat Party and the PDRC to support the next round of election, who are most likely looking for transitional guarantee amid such time of political uncertainty. Such compromise can be done in various ways so long that it is not contrary to the Constitution (for instance Pheu Thai has already agreed to a non-interference in reform process and self-impose a 1-year cap of governing period should they win an election), but since the Constitution is now rendered irrelevant by the court, it becomes much more convenient for anyone to propose drastically uncompromising power-mongering formula disguised in a form of compromise.
